Logical atomism

Logical atomism is a philosophical view that originated in the early 20th century with the development of analytic philosophy. It holds that the world consists of ultimate logical "facts" (or "atoms") that cannot be broken down any further, each of which can be understood independently of other facts.

Its principal exponent was the British philosopher Bertrand Russell. It is also widely held that the early works[a] of his Austrian-born pupil and colleague, Ludwig Wittgenstein, defend a version of logical atomism, though he went on to reject it in his later Philosophical Investigations.[b] Some philosophers in the Vienna Circle were also influenced by logical atomism (particularly Rudolf Carnap, who was deeply sympathetic to some of its philosophical aims, especially in his earlier works).[2] Gustav Bergmann also developed a form of logical atomism that focused on an ideal phenomenalistic language, particularly in his discussions of J.O. Urmson's work on analysis.[3]

The name for this kind of theory was coined in March 1911 by Russell, in a work published in French titled "Le Réalisme analytique" (published in translation as "Analytic Realism" in Volume 6 of The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell).[4] Russell was developing and responding to what he called "logical holism"—i.e., the belief that the world operates in such a way that no part can be known without the whole being known first.[5] This belief is related to monism, and is associated with the absolute idealism which was dominant in Britain at the time. The criticism of monism seen in the works of Russell and his colleague G. E. Moore can therefore be seen as an extension of their criticism of absolute idealism, particularly as it appeared in the works of F. H. Bradley and J. M. E. McTaggart.[5] Logical atomism can thus be understood as a developed alternative to logical holism, or the "monistic logic" of the absolute idealists.


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  1. ^ Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1953). G.E.M. Anscombe; Rush Rhees (eds.). Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell.
  2. ^ Carnap, R. (1934), "On the Character of Philosophic Problems (Über den Charakter der philosophischen Probleme)," translation by W. M. Malisoff, Philosophy of Science, 1, pp. 5–19.
  3. ^ Bergmann, Gustav (1957). "The Revolt Against Logical Atomism--I". The Philosophical Quarterly. 7 (29): 323–339. doi:10.2307/2217296. JSTOR 2217296.
  4. ^ Russell, Bertrand; Slater, John Greer; Frohmann, Bernd (1992). Logical and Philosophical Papers, 1909-13. Psychology Press. ISBN 9780415084468.
  5. ^ a b Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). "Russell's Logical Atomism". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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