Popular Mobilization Forces

Popular Mobilization Forces
قوات الحشد الشعبي
Iranian Supreme LeaderAli Khamenei[a][2]
PMC ChairmanFalih Al-Fayyadh
Chief of StaffAbu Fadak al-Mohammadawi
Notable commandersAbu Mahdi al-Muhandis X
Dates of operation15 June 2014 – present[3]
CountryIraqIraq
Allegiance Iran (IRGC)[b]
HeadquartersBaghdad, Iraq
IdeologyShia Islamism
Khomeinism[8]
Wilayat al-Faqih[9]
Iranian interests[10]
Anti-Sunnism[11][12]
Anti-West[13]
Anti-LGBT[14]
Political positionRight-wing[15]
Size60,000 (2014)[15]
230,000 (self claimed in 2022)[16]
Part ofIraqi Armed Forces (de jure, in effect under control of Axis of resistance)[17][18]
AlliesState allies

Non-state allies

OpponentsState opponents

Non-state opponents

Battles and wars
Designated as a terrorist group byCertain factions:
Websiteal-hashed.gov.iq

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF; Arabic: قوات الحشد الشعبي, romanizedQuwwāt al-Ḥashd ash-Shaʿbī),[49] also known as the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), is an Iranian-backed paramilitary umbrella group[50] that operates within Iraq. Although formally and legally part of the Iraqi Armed Forces and reporting directly to the prime minister,[51] PMF leaders act independently from state control and, in reality, answer to the supreme leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei.[10][52][53] It is composed of about 67 primarily Shia armed factions, almost all of which are Iranian-backed and openly pledge allegiance to Khamenei.[54][55][56] Chief of Staff of the PMF, Abu Fadak al-Mohammadawi, openly declared that the PMF takes orders from Khamenei.[57] PMF chairman Falih al-Fayyadh cooperates with the Iranian IRGC to implement Iranian instructions in Iraq and reinforce Iranian influence over the militias.[10] The PMF were formed in 2014 and fought in nearly every major battle during the War in Iraq (2013–17) against the Islamic State.[58] In December 2016, the Iraqi Council of Representatives passed a law that defined the PMF’s legal status and created the Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC; Arabic: هيئة الحشد الشعبي), which is a formal governmental agency that includes all PMF groups.[59]

Many of its main factions that belong to the Shia faction trace their origins to the "Special Groups", Iranian-sponsored Shia groups that previously fought in the Iraqi insurgency against the United States and the Coalition forces, as well as a sectarian conflict against Sunni Jihadist and Ba'athist insurgents.[54][60] Pro-Iran organizations in the PMF include the Badr Organization, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata'ib Hezbollah, Kata’ib al-Imam Ali, Saraya Khorasani, etc.[61] It has been labeled the new Iraqi Republican Guard after it was fully reorganized in early 2018 by its then commander-in-chief Haider al-Abadi, previous prime minister of Iraq, who issued "regulations to adapt the situation of the Popular Mobilization fighters".[62]

Factions within the PMF are designated as terrorist groups by some states, including the United States, the United Arab Emirates, and Japan, and have been widely accused of promoting sectarian violence,[63][64][65] perpetrating ethnic cleansing and displacement of Iraqi Sunnis,[66][67][68] and carrying out war crimes, including abductions, forced disappearances, massacres, extrajudicial killings, and the destructions of villages in Anbar, Saladin, and Diyala,[67] as well as conducting anti-Sunni campaigns described as inherently genocidal.[69][70][71][72] During the 2019–2021 Iraqi protests, the pro-Iran groups were accused of being responsible for killing and wounding large numbers of protesters and activists.[73] Pro-Iran PMF groups have also fought against pro-Sistani and Sadrist PMF groups, and their increasing rivalry erupted into violent clashes in 2022.[74][75] Since 2020, Iranian-backed PMF groups have launched attacks against American forces and its allies in the region, claiming them under the name of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq.[76][77][78][79][80][81]

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