Assad's early economic liberalisation programs worsened inequalities and centralized the socio-political power of the loyalist Damascene elite of the Assad family, alienating the Syrian rural population, urban working classes, businessmen, industrialists, and people from once-traditional Ba'ath strongholds. The Cedar Revolution in Lebanon in February 2005, triggered by the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, forced Assad to end the Syrian occupation of Lebanon.
In November 2024, a coalition of Syrian rebels mounted several offensives with the intention of ousting Assad.[11][12] On the morning of 8 December, as rebel troops first entered Damascus, Assad fled to Moscow and was granted political asylum by the Russian government.[13][14] Later that day, Damascus fell to rebel forces, and Assad's regime collapsed.[15][16][17] After his departure, mass graves were discovered with the largest believed to contain 100,000 bodies of those who opposed Assad’s administration.[18]
Academics and analysts characterized Assad's presidency as a highly personalist dictatorship,[19][20][21][22][23][24] which governed Syria as a totalitarianpolice state[25][26][27][28] and was marked by numerous human rights violations and severe repression. While the Assad government described itself as secular, various political scientists and observers noted that his regime exploited sectarian tensions in the country. Although Assad inherited the power structures and personality cult nurtured by his father, he lacked the loyalty received by his father and faced rising discontent against his rule. As a result, many people from his father's regime resigned or were purged, and the political inner circle was replaced by staunch loyalists from Alawite clans.
^Robertson QC, Geoffrey (2013). "11: Justice in Demand". Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice (4th ed.). New York: The New Press. pp. 560–562, 573, 595–607. ISBN978-1-59558-860-9.
^Weeks, Jessica (2014). Dictators at War and Peace. Cornell University Press. p. 18.
^Wedeen, Lisa (2018). Authoritarian Apprehensions. Chicago Studies in Practices of Meaning. University of Chicago Press. Archived from the original on 21 October 2019.
^Hinnebusch, Raymond (2012). "Syria: from 'authoritarian upgrading' to revolution?". International Affairs. 88 (1): 95–113. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01059.x.
^Michalik, Susanne (2015). "Measuring Authoritarian Regimes with Multiparty Elections". In Michalik, Susanne (ed.). Multiparty Elections in Authoritarian Regimes: Explaining their Introduction and Effects. Studien zur Neuen Politischen Ökonomie. Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. pp. 33–45. doi:10.1007/978-3-658-09511-6_3. ISBN978-3658095116.
^Khamis, Sahar; Gold, Paul B.; Vaughn, Katherine (2013). "22. Propaganda in Egypt and Syria's "Cyberwars": Contexts, Actors, Tools, and Tactics". In Auerbach, Castronovo; Jonathan, Russ (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Propaganda Studies. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 422. ISBN978-0-19-976441-9.
^Wieland, Carsten (2018). "6: De-neutralizing Aid: All Roads Lead to Damascus". Syria and the Neutrality Trap: The Dilemmas of Delivering Humanitarian Aid Through Violent Regimes. London: I. B. Tauris. p. 68. ISBN978-0-7556-4138-3.
^Ahmed, Saladdin (2019). Totalitarian Space and the Destruction of Aura. State University of New York Press, Albany: Suny Press. pp. 144, 149. ISBN9781438472911.
^Hensman, Rohini (2018). "7: The Syrian Uprising". Indefensible: Democracy, Counterrevolution, and the Rhetoric of Anti-Imperialism. Chicago: Haymarket Books. ISBN978-1-60846-912-3.